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Minors and Gambling Regulation
Malgorzata (Margaret) Carran*
Early initiation of gambling has been argued to be closely correlated with placing players
at higher risk of developing problem gambling behaviour in the future. The vast majority of
jurisdictions, including Great Britain, attempts to eliminate minors’ access to gambling by
making it illegal and by requiring gambling providers to adopt strict age-verification pro-
cedures. Despite those measures minors continue to successfully access gambling. This pa-
per demonstrates that British legal framework suffers from many statutory loopholes. It con-
siders weaknesses in the regulatory offences as well as enforcement deficiencies. It further
highlights how the differences between black letter law, political rhetoric and practical ap-
plication undermine the strength of the prohibition of gambling by minors.
I. Introduction
The current legal framework that governs all regulat-
ed gambling, other than the National Lottery in Great
Britain was established by the Gambling Act 2005.
The main purpose of the Act was to liberalise prior
statutory regime inorder to better reflect the commer-
cial nature of the activity, to offer a better choice for
adult consumers and to eliminate the anomaly which
sawBritish operators beingbanned fromoffering and
advertising online gambling services while foreign
providers were permitted free access to GB customer
base.1 The majority of the provisions came into force
on 1st September 2007 and almost instantly changed
the nature of gambling from a permitted but non-
stimulated and discouraged activity to a regulated but
commercially promoted entertainment offered on a
relatively unrestricted basis. Gambling was recog-
nised as a legitimate entertainment rather than an in-
herent “vice” that should be freely permitted subject
only to the implementationofappropriatesafeguards.
TheGamblingAct 2005hasbeen implemented rel-
atively recently and accurate evaluation of any regu-
lations’ true effectiveness is complex, especially in
light of the relative paucity of methodologically
sound empirical data.2 In light of the variety of exist-
ing concept papers this article does not aim to under-
take another generic assessment of the impact of cur-
rent legislative framework on potential future levels
of problem gambling. It also does not intend to crit-
icise or support existing political choice as such. In-
stead this article aims to offer the reader a narrower
but an in-depth evaluation of specific statutory pro-
visions to highlight that the actual legislative frame-
work does not truly support the third licencing ob-
jective3 or the political rhetoric utilised to justify the
passage of the Act. The gambling law, in many as-
pects, resembles the current regulationof alcohol and
liquor industry making the analysis relevant to this
risk behaviour as well. Cogent medical evidence of
the social cost of smoking recently compelled thegov-
ernment to re-evaluate their policies with regards to
tobacco products. Although the process of active sup-
pression of cigarettes has started only recently, its
very slow success to date4 on overall smoking levels
proves that reversing liberalisationor supressingpre-
* The City Law School, City University London. I am grateful to my
supervisors Professor Julia Hornle, Queen Mary University of
London and Professor Mark Griffiths, Nottingham Trent University
for their support and helpful comments on my research and
written work. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer
for very constructive feedback. All errors are of course mine.
1 Report of the Gaming Board for Great Britain 2001–2002, p. 4;
Presented pursuant to Act Eliz. II 1968 c.65 s.50; ordered by the
House of Common to be printed 11th July 2002; available on the
Internet at <www.official-documents.gov.uk/docu-
ment/hc0102/hc10/1016/1016.pdf> (last accessed in November
2013). The liberalising nature of the new legislation is also em-
bedded in the Gambling Act 2005 itself which can be seen by a
joint reading of ss. 1, 22 and 72.
2 As identified by Simon Planzer and Heather Wardle “The Com-
parative Effectiveness of Regulatory Approaches and the Impact
of Advertising on Propensity for Problem Gambling”; (2011)
report for the Responsible Gambling Fund (currently Responsi-
ble Gambling Trust), London available on the internet at
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045052>, (last accessed November
2013) .
3 S. 1(c) of the Gambling Act 2005
4 It is reported that since 2000 the overall adults smoking rate are
declining by 0.4% annually. ASH Fact Sheet on Smoking Statis-
tics, March 2013, available on the Internet at
<www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_106.pdf> (last accessed
November 2013) .
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viously stimulated demand is somewhat difficult.
This article is designed to consider each of the three
paradigms that underpin the success or failure of any
normative rule aimed at regulating social behaviour
in turn. Those are: strength and clarity of statutory
provisions; effective enforcement and social accep-
tance of the rule.5 After setting the context and ex-
plaining the legislative framework the article firstly
evaluates the effectiveness of statutory measures
aimed at preventing minors’ access to “for money”
gambling services followed by the analysis of effec-
tivenessof the enforcementpolicy.The final part con-
siders the extent to which gambling exposure has
been legalised thatmayaffect social adherence to reg-
ulatory prohibitions.
II. The context
Safeguards designed to prevent excess, to ensure
that gambling does not lead to higher levels of crime
or social disorder and to “prevent children and other
vulnerable persons from being exploited or harmed
by gambling” are necessary.6 There is no common
definitionof “harmful gambling” 7and formanypeo-
ple the activity offers exciting and harmless enter-
tainment. Yet, for some participants gambling caus-
es highlynegative individual and financial outcomes
andmay lead to the development of gambling disor-
der8 as recognised by the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–V9) which disad-
vantageously impacts the society as a whole. In this
article the term “gambling related problems” is used
in a broad and all-inclusive manner to refer to any
negative consequences resulting from gambling ac-
tivity that adversely affects a person regardless of
whether this individual acknowledges the negative
consequences or not. The existing empirical evi-
dence is conclusive that certain groups of individu-
als are at increased risk of developing gambling re-
lated problems and the developmental stage of the
adolescents makes them especially vulnerable. The
psychological literature from across different juris-
dictions is in agreement that risk to minors suffer-
ing gambling related problems is approximately
three to four times higher than it is the case with
adults.10 Young people “are considered to be espe-
cially at risk for problem gambling due to their need
to satisfy internal motivation with limited ability to
cognitively understand the risks11”. Minors also expe-
riencehighcomorbidity ratesbetweengamblingand
other psychological problems such a depres-
sion,12 alcohol, drug abuse and smoking.13 The
progress towards gambling addiction,which is a pro-
gressive illness, may be hidden for many years due
to lack of clearly visible signs of harm, especially
amongst adolescents.14Whendifficulties begin they
are often further exacerbated by minors being less
likely to recognise or accept that they may have a
problem and by being less likely than adults to ask
5 D. J. Galligan, Law in Modern Society, Clarendon Law Series,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007).
6 S. 1 of the Gambling Act 2005
7 The use of the term “harmful gambling” within the literature is
inconsistent and varies depending on the nature of study and the
screening measure used. It includes pathological, compulsive,
problem and at-risk gambling.
8 DSM-V defines gambling disorder as:
“A. Persistent and recurrent problematic gambling behavior as
indicated by four (or more) of the following in a 12-month
period: 1. Needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money
in order to achieve the desired excitement; 2.Is restless or
irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling; 3. Has
repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop
gambling; 4. Is often preoccupied with gambling (e.g., persis-
tent thoughts of reliving past gambling experiences, handicap-
ping or planning the next venture, or thinking of ways to get
money with which to gamble); 5. Gambles often when feeling
distressed (e.g., helpless, guilty, anxious, depressed);6. After
losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even
(“chasing” one’s losses); 7. Lies to conceal the extent of involve-
ment with gambling;8. Has jeopardized or lost a significant
relationship, job, or educational or career opportunity because
of gambling;9 .Relies on others to provide money to relieve
desperate financial situations caused by gambling; B. The
gambling behavior is not better accounted for by a Manic
Episode.”
9 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM
– V) has recently been published. Further details will are available
on the Internet at <http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx> (last
accessed on 25 November 2013) and a brief comment by Simon
Planzer is available in this issue.
10 S.E. Fisher, “A prevalence study of gambling and problem gam-
bling in British adolescents”, 7 Addiction Research (1999),
pp. 509 et sqq. Similar results can be found in other jurisdic-
tions. See H.J. Shaffer, R. LaBrie, and S. Canlan et al, “Pathologi-
cal gambling amongst adolescents: Massachusetts gambling
screen (MAGS)”; 10 Journal of Gambling Studies (1994) pp. 339
et sqq.
11 Margee Hume and Gillian, Sullivan Mort, “Fun, Friend, or Foe:
Youth Perceptions and Definitions of Online Gambling”, 17(1)
Social Marketing Quarterly (2011), pp. 109 et sqq.
12 Catriona Morrison and Helen Gore, “The relationship between
excessive internet use and depression: a questionnaire – based
study of 1,319 young people and adults”, 43 Psychopathology
(2010), pp. 121 et sqq.
13 Steve Sussman, Nadra Lisha and Mark Griffiths, “Prevalence of
the Addictions: a problem of the majority or the minority?” 34
Eval Health Professional (2011).
14 Many negative outcomes associated with problem gambling
amongst adults are visible such as losing jobs, home repossession
or divorce but those do not apply to children as they are still at
school, live with their parents and are unmarried.
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for help when experiencing gambling related is-
sues.15
Those are compelling reasons why any govern-
ment wishing to liberalise and expand gambling in-
dustry should counterbalance the potential risks
with appropriate measures to protect minors and
other vulnerable persons and regularly monitor
their effectiveness.However,whatmeasures are con-
sidered sufficient, whether any are necessary at all
and how they are situated within the legislative
framework is determined by a specific political
choice that results from balancing politically diffi-
cult questions of morality, priorities in public health
versus economy and commercial interests. With re-
gards to gambling the author is unawareof any schol-
ar that advocates an entirely laissez faire approach
and jurisdictions that have been identified as per-
mitting unregulated online forms of gam-
bling16 (Costa Rica, Panama and Belize) have been
placed in this category due to their practical ineffec-
tiveness of controlling their offerings rather than
due to genuine lack of any regulations.17 Some juris-
dictions choose the opposite approach and they pro-
hibit gambling either in entirety18 or they prohibit
some forms of it (most frequently online / remote
offerings).19 This method has been argued by many
scholars to be ineffective due to the wide social ac-
ceptance of gambling as a leisure activity that is pop-
ular in demand and which attracts lowmoral oppro-
brium.20 The vast majority of jurisdictions prefer to
permit gambling subject to legal regulationsandcon-
trols. The level of legal intervention varies signifi-
cantly between different States. Regulators that
agree with scholars who perceive gambling as inher-
ently dangerous and an “addictive consumption in-
dustry”21 tolerate gambling but aim to restrict avail-
ability, suppress advertisements and impose tight
controls on the operators. Others agree with schol-
ars who advocate for gambling to be treated as a le-
gitimate leisure activity.22 Those legal frameworks
permits active commercial promotion of all forms
of gambling and focus predominantly on ensuring
that customers are treated fairly and have themeans
to make an informed choice whether to participate
or not. Bogart in the book “Permit but Discour-
age”23 extensively analysed different regulatory
regimes of risk behaviour and argues that permit-
ting risk activities but actively discouraging partici-
pation by subtle “nudges”24 is the most effective
method.
In Great Britain the current regulatory framework
treats gambling in a similar way to the supply of al-
cohol but differently to the supply of cigarettes and
tobacco products. The acceptance of the medical ev-
idence that stipulates that there are no safe levels of
smoking and even minimal amounts are harmful
whereas alcohol and gambling can be harmless if en-
joyed in a responsible way justifies such differentia-
tion. However, early exposure and participation has
been identified byMesserlian et al25 as themost like-
15 Karen Hardoon, Jeffrey Derevesky and Rina Gupta, “Empirical
measures vs. perceived gambling severity among youth – why
adolescents problem gamblers fail to seek treatment”, 28 Addic-
tive Behaviors (2003), pp. 933 et sqq.
16 Jamie Wiebe and Michael Lipton, “An Overview of Internet
Gambling Regulations”, August 2008 submitted to the Ontario
Problem Gambling Research Centre, available on the Internet at
<www.gamblingresearch.org/applydownload.php?do-
cid=11002>, (last accessed in November 2013).
17 Costa Rica permits any company to offer online gambling services
worldwide provided they do not accept wagers from Costa
Rica residents and earning money from games of chance is
illegal in their jurisdictions – see <http://www.gam-
blingsites.com/online-gambling-jurisdictions/costa-rica>; Panama
and Belize require companies to obtain licences under their
Panama Online Gaming Act of 2002 and the Belize Gaming
Control Act respectively. Belize government announces on their
official website that there are only two companies that are in
possession of Belize licence (Fulton Data Processing Limited and
Sports Off-Shore Limited) and everyone else claiming to have
such a licence are clandestine – see <http://www.be-
lize.gov.bz/ct.asp?xItem=1953&ctNode=346>.
18 E.g. See Saudi Arabia for a total prohibition of any gambling
under Islamic Sharia law.
19 E.g. See Russia for a partial prohibition of online gambling or US
for their attempt at outlawing online interstate gambling.
20 See arguments by Ian Abovitz, “Why the United States should
rethink its legal approach to internet gambling: a comparative
analysis of regulatory models that have been successfully imple-
mented in foreign jurisdictions”, 22 Temp. Int @ I & Comp. L.J.
(2008), p. 437. See also Bentham Dayanim, “Internet Gambling
Under Siege”, 11(5) Gaming Law Review (2007).
21 E.g. P. Adams, J. Raeburn and K. De Silva, “A question of balance:
Prioritizing Public Health Responses to Harm from Gambling”,
104(5) Addiction (2009), pp. 688 et sqq., cited by Simon Planzer
and Heather Wardle, “The Comparative Effectiveness of Regulato-
ry Approaches and the Impact of Advertising on propensity for
Problem Gambling”, (2011) report for the Responsible Gambling
Fund, available on the Internet at <http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2045052>, (last accessed November 2013).
22 E.g. D. Korn, “Expansion of Gambling in Canada: Implications for
Health and Social Policy”, 163 (1) Canadian Medical Association
Journal (2000), pp. 61 et sqq., or A. Blaszczynski, R. Ladoucer
and H. Shaffer “A Science-based framework for Responsible
Gambling: The Reno Model”, 20 Journal of Gambling Studies
(2004), pp. 301 et sqq.
23 W. A. Bogart, Permit But Discourage: Regulating Excessive Con-
sumption, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011).
24 Such as targeted taxation or public education campaigns.
25 Carmen Messerlian, Andrea Byrne and Jeffrey Derevensky, “Gam-
bling, Youth and the Internet: Should we be concerned?”, 13(1)
The Canadian Child and Adolescents Psychiatry Review (2004).
EJRR 04|2013512 Minors and Gambling Regulation
ly predictor of the development of problem gam-
bling. Although the recent parliamentary re-
view26 conceded that there is still “insufficient data
collected” to determine the effect of the Gambling
Act on minors, it does not refute the Rank Group’s
view that the rates of play amongst adolescents are
“still unacceptably high”. This is concerning. Despite
the lack of definitive proof of causation between ear-
ly involvement in gambling and subsequent prob-
lems27 it is undisputed that early participation is cor-
related with increased risk. This is supported not on-
ly by the fact that “adults diagnosed as problem gam-
blers nearly always report early initiation”28 but also
by available evidence fromother “risk industries”. No
similar consensus has been reached with regards to
a mere exposure which has been pointed out by
Planzer and Wardle29 to be distinct from an actual
engagement. The social adaptation theory indicates
that over time people learn how to successfully deal
with new social phenomena without suffering nega-
tive consequences.30 The adaptive process, however,
clearly fails for those who develop gambling related
problems and the question remains whether signifi-
cant expansion of gambling opportunities permitted
under the Gambling Act significantly increases the
number of those who found themselves unable to
adapt to the new environment.
III. Legislative framework
The need to prevent children from gambling partic-
ipation has been explicitly put at the forefront of the
GamblingAct. It prominently states in s. 1(c) that one
of the licencing objectives of the Act is to ensure that
“children and other vulnerable persons are not harmed
or exploited by gambling”. The Act makes a tacit dis-
tinction between soft, medium and hard core forms
of gambling by excluding the former from the Act’s
application and by setting different age limits applic-
able to medium and hard forms. Hard gambling is
perceived by the draftsman to be potentially most
harmful31 and includes commercial gaming in casi-
nos; class A, B and C slot machines and commercial
betting which are permitted only for those over the
age of 18. Medium types include national lottery,
scratch-cards and football pools for which the age
limit is set at 16 and soft forms of gambling include
non-commercial forms of gaming and betting,32 Cat-
egory D gaming machines,33 equal chance gaming
under prize gaming permit or at a licenced family en-
tertainmentcentre34andparticipation inaprizegam-
ing at a non-licenced family entertainment centre or
at a travelling fair.35
The legislation starts from the basic premises that
under-aged customers will be sufficiently protected
from gambling related harm if they are isolated from
“hard core”36andmediumgamblingactivities.To this
effect the Gambling Act created new offences, listed
in Part IV of the Act,37 that underpin the need for the
gambling industry to develop, adopt and monitor
age-verification measures in order to prevent inap-
propriate access. The offences can broadly be classi-
fied as “invitation”, “employment” and “participation”
offences. The first one can be committed by “a per-
son” while the remaining two can be committed by
“a person” or “a young person”. No definition of “a
person” is provided within the Act but “young per-
son” is an “individual who is not a child but who is less
than 18 years old”38 and a child is “an individual who
is less than 16 years old”.39 This implies, on the basis
of the principle unius est exclusion alterius, that a
child is not capable of committing any of the offences
under the Act and a young person can be liable only
for those that are specifically mentioned. This is in
contrast with the provisions of the National Lottery
26 Parliamentary report “The Gambling Act 2005: A bet worth
taking” published by the Media, Culture and Sports Committee
on 12 July 2012, available on the Internet at http://www.publica-
tions.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/smc-
umeds/421/42102.htm (last accessed in November 2013)
27 David Forrest and Ian McHale, “Gambling and Problem Gam-
bling Among Young Adolescents in Great Britain”, 28 Journal of
Gambling Studies (2012), pp. 607 et sqq.
28 Forest and McHale, 28 Journal of Gambling Studies (2012), supra
note 27, at p. 607.
29 Simon Planzer and Heather Wardle, “The Comparative Effec-
tiveness of Regulatory Approaches and the Impact of Advertising
on Propensity for Problem Gambling” (2011) report for Respon-
sible Gambling Fund, London, available on the Internet at
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045052>, (last accessed in Novem-
ber 2013).
30 Planzer and Wardle, supra note 29.
31 Stephen Monckom and contributors, Smith and Mockom the Law
of Gambling” 3rd ed, (Tottel Publishing 2009), at p. 304.
32 S. 46(2)a and s46(2)b of the Gambling Act 2005.
33 S. 46(2)d of the GA 2005.
34 S. 46(2)f and s. 46(2)g of the GA 2005.
35 S. 46(2)h and s. 46(2)i of the GA 2005.
36 Stephen Monckom and contributors, Smith and Mockom the Law
of Gambling” 3rd ed, (Tottel Publishing 2009).
37 Titled “Protection of children and young persons”.
38 S. 45(2) of the GA 2005.
39 S. 45(1) of the GA 2005.
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etc Act 1993where an offence of selling a lottery tick-
et can be committed by anyone subject to criminal
liability; that is anyone over the age of 10.40 All types
of offences under Part IV of the Gambling Act are
subject to the same potential punishment.41 Convict-
ed adults or corporate entities can be liable, on sum-
mary conviction, to imprisonment for a maximum
period of 51 weeks or a maximum statutory fine42 or
both, while a young person can be liable for a maxi-
mum fine of £1000.
“To invite, cause or permits a child or young person
or both to engage in a [prohibited]43 gambling activ-
ity” is made unlawful by ss. 46(1), 56 and 57. S. 47
criminalises any person who “invites or permits a
child or young person” to enter a variety of premises
where prohibited gambling is taking place or where
there are opportunities for such gambling to occur.
Those premises exhaustively include a casi-
no,44 premises with a betting licence where betting
actually takes place,45 areas used in pursuance of
adults gaming centre licence,46 areas where betting
facilities are located on a horse or dog track unless a
horse or dog race is either taking place or is due to
take place on the same day47 and premises with fam-
ily entertainment licence where Category C gaming
machines areusedor capable ofbeingused.48Premis-
es are defined as “including any place and, in partic-
ular (a) a vessel, and (b) a vehicle”.49 Invitation of-
fences have the broadest potential application. The
Act does not define what “inviting, causing or permit-
ting to gamble” means but the natural language of
the section suggests broad interpretation. The words
must be read disjunctively as each describes a differ-
ent type of conduct and the proof of any of them in-
dividually would suffice for a conviction but the ap-
plicationhas tobe confinedonly to the specificwords
chosen and all other types of behaviour must be ex-
cluded.50
“Employment” offences are committed if a child
is employed toprovide facilities for gambling includ-
ing lottery or football pools51 but excluding private
or non-commercial gaming or betting or prize gam-
ing at a travelling fair under s. 29252. It is also un-
lawful to employ a child to perform any function on
premises where bingo is being played,53 on premis-
es that are used in pursuance of a club gaming or
clubmachine permit54 or in premises which operate
under casino premises licence, betting premises li-
cence or an adult gaming centre premises licence un-
less the child is employed in an area where they can-
not get engaged in any gambling functions.55A child
must also not be employed on premises where Cat-
egory A, B, C or D gamingmachines are situated and
the child may have to perform any duties with re-
gards to the operation of those machines.56 Identi-
cal provisions apply to the employment of a young
person with the exception of employment in con-
nection with the lottery, football pools, bingo or
premises with gaming permit or club machine per-
mit.
“Participation” offences are addressed towards
young persons. A child is not capable of committing
any crime under the Act but a young person may be
liable if s/he is engaged in a prohibited gam-
bling,57 provides facilities for such activity58 or en-
ters premiseswhere a young person’s presence could
expose the proprietor to a liability.59
The legislation does not aim to rely exclusively on
criminal law to prevent minors’ participation. It
prominently charges the Gambling Commission,
which took over from the Gaming Board as a corpo-
rate body to regulate the gambling industry, to issue
appropriate licences and to ensure compliance, with
the task of developing an appropriate strategy for the
40 With the removal of presumption of doli incapax by s. 34 of the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 a person is presumed to be crimi-
nally competent from the age of 10.
41 S. 62 of the GA 2005.
42 Currently level 5 which equal £5000 under s. 17 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1991.
43 S. 46(2) lists several exceptions which permits soft types of
gambling to be offered to minors despite them otherwise satisfy-
ing the definition of gambling within the meaning of s. 3 of the
Act.
44 S. 47(1) of the GA 2005.
45 S. 47(4) of the GA 2005.
46 S. 47(5) of the GA 2005.
47 S. 47(6) and s. 182 of the GA 2005.
48 S. 47(7) of the GA 2005.
49 S. 353 (1) of the GA 2005.
50 This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the legislator
specifically choose inviting, causing and permitting to gamble but
only inviting and permitting to enter restricted premises.
51 S. 52 of GA 2005.
52 S. 51 of the GA 2005.
53 S. 53(a) of the GA 2005.
54 S. 53(b) of the GA 2005.
55 S. 55(1) and (2) of the GA 2005.
56 S. 54(1)a and b of the GA 2005.
57 S. 48 of the GA 2005.
58 S. 50 of the GA 2005.
59 S. 49 of the GA 2005.
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protection of minors.60 The Commission is deemed
to be independent but it operates under the supervi-
sion of and reports to the Department of Media, Cul-
ture and Sport. It publishes industry’s guidance; sets
and reviews licence conditions and grants appropri-
ate licences; monitors compliance and applies a va-
riety of regulatory sanctions for non-compliance.
Those sanctions vary from issuing warnings and in-
creased inspection levels which may lead to higher
administrative costs for the business thus encourag-
ing compliance, to financial penalties and removal
of a licence or instigation of criminal prosecutions.
IV. How effective is it?
The criminalisation of allowing underage gambling
and the prominent role allocated to the Gambling
Commission appears to send a strong legislative di-
rective that children should not be involved in any
hard core gambling. The Gambling Commission and
the gambling industry undertook significant efforts
to eliminate underage gambling but despite those ef-
forts a significant number of children still partici-
pate. The latest Ipsos Mori research undertaken on
behalf of National Lottery Commission61 showed
that during the sevendays preceding the survey, 18%
of children between the age of 11 and 15 were in-
volved in some forms of gambling where they actu-
ally spend money. Although this represents a drop
from 2011 which saw 23% of children admitting to
gambling it cannot, as yet, be taken as representing
a downwards trend. The rate of gambling amongmi-
norswas 22% in 2007which dropped by 4% in 2008
to 18%62 for it only to rise again to 23% in 2011. 16
to 18 years old are excluded from the above men-
tioned survey. They are included in the British Preva-
lence Survey but are grouped together with 18 to 24
years old rather than being treated as an indepen-
dent cohort. The latest British Prevalence Surveywas
carried out in 201063 and reported that 68% of re-
spondents aged between 16 and 24 participated in
some forms of gambling which includes lot-
tery.64 Previous rates were 58% in 2007 and 66% in
1999. Although themajority of the players in this cat-
egory are likely to be those over 18 it is legitimate65 to
assume that some of them would fall within the 16
to 18 age group.
The figures above show that the legislative mes-
sagedoesnot seem, as yet, to reach a substantial num-
ber of people who continue to be engaged in activi-
ties that are illegal for them. In the author’s view this
is not surprising. A detailed analysis of the statutory
framework shows that the seemingly strong desire
to stop underage access is a political rhetoric and the
actual position is significantly more relaxed and lib-
eral. Any normative rule that aims to regulate social
behaviour relies on three interrelated factors:
strength and clarity of the provision; effective en-
forcement and social acceptance of the rule. As it will
be demonstrated below, the current legislative
regime has significant loopholes in each of the three
aspectswhich undermine the overall effectiveness of
the legislative framework.
V. Statutory weaknesses
The nature of the criminal offences created by the
Gambling Act 2005 places them firmly within the
regulatory type of mala prohibita offences as op-
posed to mala per se66. Yet, the Act does not stipu-
late the offences to be of strict liability nor does it
provide any comprehensive definition of the mens
rea, if any at all, that is required. Only s. 46(3) pro-
vides, with regards to sending advertisement to a
child or young person, that such distribution will in-
cur criminal liability if it was done intentionally. If a
marketing document was sent with contact details of
a relevant person67 no offence is committed if this
person did not consent or gave authority for such
communication or if such document was sent to an
adult and minor’s exposure to it was merely inciden-
60 S. 1(c) of the GA 2005.
61 Ipsos Mori Research “Underage gambling in England and Wales”,
published in July 2012, available on the Internet at
<http://www.natlotcomm.gov.uk/publications-and-research/re-
search-programme/underage-play/ipsos-mori-young-people-om-
nibus-2012.html>, (last accessed in November 2013).
62 The same level as reported in 2012.
63 Heather Wardle, Alison Moody, Suzanne Spence et al, “British
Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010” (2011) prepared for Gam-
bling Commission and published by National Centre for Social
Research, available on the Internet at <www.gamblingcommis-
sion.gov.uk>, (last accessed November 2013).
64 Wardle, Moody and Spence supra note 63, at p. 37.
65 By comparison with prevalence rate available for those under the
age of 16.
66 J. F. Windersheid, “Victimless crimes: The Threshold questions
and beyond”, 52 Notre Dame Lawyer (1977), No. 995.
67 Relevant person is a “person to whom payment may be made or
from whom information can be obtained”.
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tal.68 This makes is clear that, at least with regards to
advertisement, the actus reus must be accompanied
by the requisite intention before anyone can be suc-
cessfully convicted. No such clarity is available for
the other offences but the provision of statutory de-
fence of due diligence69 makes it clear that they are
not of strict liability either. By comparison, selling a
national lottery ticket to an under-aged customer has
been considered to be of strict liability in Harrow
London Borough Council v Shah.70 Such conclusion
wasbasedon theneed to “encourage greater vigilance
against the commission of offenses71”. This anomaly
cannot be explained by the different hazard levels of
both activities as in fact lottery is considered to be
one of the less addictive type of gambling. Rather it
is an evidence of the relaxation of political attitudes
towards gambling generally.
The due diligence defence set out in s. 63(1) is suf-
ficiently significant to justify its full exposition.
S. 63(1) provides “where a “person is charged with an
offence under this Part of doing anything in relation
to an individual who is a child it is a defence for the
person charged to prove that – (a) he took all reason-
able steps to determine the individual’s age, and (b)
he reasonably believed that the individual is not a
child”. S. 63(2) is a corresponding provision relating
to a young person. Both elements must be satisfied.
Reasonable belief without taking due care to ascer-
tain the age of the customer will not suffice. What
constitutes “reasonable steps” would be determined
on the basis of individual circumstances but to date
there is no direct precedent that would offer some
judicial determination. The availability of the de-
fence, coupled with the generic difficulties of prov-
ing subjective beliefs and knowledge, already weak-
ens the provisions as itmakes successful prosecution
very difficult.
This is further exacerbated by the interpretation
of those rules offered by the Gambling Commission
which understandably has been adopted by the in-
dustry. The Commission, in the Licence Conditions
and Codes of Practice provides extensive guidance as
to the procedures that the operators should adopt to
ensure compliance. The Code lacks the statutory
force but it gains its regulatory authority from s. 24
of theAct. This section dictates that Courtsmust con-
sider the application and scope of the Code, if rele-
vant, when determining the outcome of any civil or
criminal litigation.72 Due to the practical variations
between face to face and online interaction the Code
makes different provisions for each environments.
The Code requires all providers to develop, imple-
ment andmonitor policies andprocedures to prevent
minors from accessing their services. Within the on-
line environment the Code mandatorily prescribes
for such policy to includewarnings to customers that
underage gambling is an offence, a requirement that
players must affirm that they are of legal age, a re-
quirement of adequate training for staff and a regu-
lar review of existing policies to take account of tech-
nological advances.
In land based establishments the age-verification
takes place at the point of purchase. Online, due to
the distant nature of the transactions, the Code per-
mits a period of 72 hours within which the age-veri-
fication process must be completed. In the interim
period the customer is permitted to use the services,
i.e. gamble but no withdrawals can bemade until the
player is fully verified as over the age of 18.73 There
is no provision within the Act that would discharge
the provider from liability in the interim period be-
tween an attempt to gamble and the provider recog-
nising that the attempt was made by a minor. This
means that the permitted 72 hours time-lag has no
statutory basis and should not be supported, espe-
cially when the modern capabilities of online tech-
nology allow the customers to be verified almost in-
stantly and in real time. Commercial realities dictate
that companies should be allowed to use a variety of
effective age-verificationmechanisms but there is no
reasonwhy a customer shouldnot be prevented from
gambling until after the process has been fully com-
pleted. A child may never attempt to withdrawmon-
ey; yet they may become excited about the game it-
self.
Secondly, the Code permits reliance on e.g. age –
verification software solutions or credit cards com-
panies provided the gambling provider is satisfied
that the third party carried out the age-verification
process satisfactorily. The statutory defence should
68 S. 46(3), (4), (5) and (6) of the GA 2005.
69 S. 63 of GA 2005.
70 Harrow London Borough Council v Shah [2000] 1 W.L.R.83.
71 Harrow London Borough Council v Shah [2000] 1 W.L.R.83.
72 S. 24(9) of the GA 2005.
73 “The Licence Conditions and Code of Practice”, Gambling
Commission, consolidated in December 2011, available on the
Internet at <www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk>, (last accessed in
November 2013).
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only bemade out if “all reasonable steps are taken by
the person (providing the facility74) himself” where-
as the Code effectively permits the delegation of this
task to third parties. This is so despite the lack of of-
ficial authorisation by the credit card companies to
use their cards for online verification purposes. Age-
verification software providers actively promote
their products to gambling industry. There are sever-
al offerings with different business models and dif-
ferent pricing structures available on the market but
the use of third parties is not compatible with the
black letter law.
It may be argued that this should not be raised as
a matter of concern because it seems that these on-
line methods are significantly more effective than
their land based equivalents. Chambers and
Willox75 examined 15 large sites listed on the stock
exchange and reported that all operators required ac-
tual proof of age76 before using the site but the au-
thors do not stipulate, in theirmethodology, whether
this was ascertained by relying on the information
provided on the site or whether an actual test pur-
chase was attempted. Nevertheless, the rolling mys-
tery shopping exercise carried out by the Gambling
Commission indicated that only 4.7% of gambling
websites were identified as being potentially vulner-
able to minors’ attempts to play77 and prevalence
studies confirm that the rates of play by minors on-
line for money is low.78 This may be contrasted with
land based establishments where the compliance
rates have been found to be significantly lower. The
original test purchases conducted inMay 2009 in bet-
ting shops known to have failings in social responsi-
bilitymeasures produced a staggeringly low 2% rate
of compliance.79 Follow-up mystery shopping exer-
cise carried out in betting shops in December
200980 and in adult gaming centres in June
201081 showed that Gambling Commission’s efforts
were producing excellent results. Yet still no full ad-
herence to the ruleswas establishedwith 64.4%com-
pliance rate for betting shops and 70.64% for adult
gaming centres being reported. The Gambling Com-
mission views those rates as “encouraging”82 despite
them actually representing that approximately one
in three attempts to play made by minors may still
be successful. It is accepted that 100% compliance is
perhaps never achievable but one in three still repre-
sents too many.
Some scholars consider online gambling verifica-
tion processes to be excellent and so good that they
should be used as a model example to other indus-
tries dealing with age-restricted products.83 The tests
and studies undertaken appear to confirm this view
as they indicate high compliance rates. Nevertheless,
those optimistic results should be treated with cau-
tion. The Gambling Commission’s methodology in-
volves testing gambling websites against purchases
made by debit card linked to a child bank account
and against compliance with the Code. This may not
identify issues that may arise if alternative payment
methods are used such as pre-paid cards, pay-safe
cards, direct bank transfer or newly created payment
mechanisms such is “bitcoin”84 and as it has already
been highlighted the Code focuses on ensuring that
no customer canwithdrawmoneywithout being ver-
ified rather than emphasising solely that no-one un-
der the age of 18 really plays. The testing programme
does not extend to sites that are either licenced by
other jurisdictions or who may operate illegally alto-
gether and the results only reflect the verification of
74 Note added.
75 C. Chambers and C. Willox, “Gambling on compliance with the
new 2005 Act: Do organisation fulfil new regulation?”, 23 Inter-
national Review of Law, Computers and Technology (2009),
pp. 203 et sqq.
76 As opposed to mere asking customers to self-affirm their age.
77 Gambling Commission (2009) “Online Mystery Shopping Pro-
gramme”, Information Note, July 2009; available on the Internet
at <www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk>, (last accessed November
2013). 2.5% of websites were identified as inconclusive and
2.2%were identified as having weaknesses.
78 Ipsos Mori Research on Underage Gambling on behalf of the
National Lottery 2012 reported only 2% of minors aged 11–15
gambling online for money.
79 Press release “Mystery Shopping tests continue”, 31st July 2009.
A 17 year old was able to place a bet over the counter in 98 out
of 100 betting shops, available on the Internet at <www.gam-
blingcommission.gov.uk>, (last accessed February 2013)
80 Press release “Underage gambling in betting shops – operators
face further tests”, 3rd December 2009, available on the Internet at
<www.gablingcommission.gov.uk>, (last accessed February 2013).
81 Press release “Monitoring underage gambling in adult gaming
centres”, 15th June 2010, available on the Internet at <www.gam-
blingcommission.gov.uk>, (last accessed February 2013)
82 Gambling Commission Annual Report and Accounts 2010/2011
at page 16. The Annual report and Accounts 2011/2012 do not
provide any details relating specifically to test purchases in land
based establishments.
83 Mark Griffith, “Internet Gambling, Players Protection and Social
Responsibility” in Robert Williams, Robert T Wood and Jonathan
Parke (ed.), International Handbook of Internet Gambling (Lon-
don: Routledge International 2012).
84 “Several online gambling sites are planning to accept Bitcoins” –
see Robert Courtneidge, Vicky Lloyds and Locke Lord, “Accepting
Bitcoin as payment for online gambling services”, 12(2) World
Online Gambling Law Report (2013).
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the gambling account holder and not necessarily of
who actually plays.
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that online it is
it is quite difficult for a minor to access legitimate
“for money” gambling games in his or her own name
due to a combination of the inability to pay by cash,
the industry real willingness to adopt robust age-ver-
ificationmeasures and the strict procedures adopted
by financial institutionswhenprocessing online pay-
ment transactions. However, theremay be several in-
stances where an underage person gambles online
using the account of parents, older siblings or friends
with or without their permissions. In Great Britain
the attitudes towards gambling are becoming in-
creasingly positive across all socio-economic sectors
of the population.85 Research from other jurisdic-
tions also shows that many parents do not consider
gambling to present significant risks to their chil-
dren,86 consider gambling as a legitimate alternative
to other forms of entertainment that can be enjoyed
by a family together87 and the allure of a potential
life changing win makes gambling products (e.g. lot-
tery tickets or scratch-cards) an attractive gift to
youngsters88.
This shows that, unlike the purchase of alcohol
and cigarettes, many parents may be less concerned
about purchasing gambling products for their chil-
dren. More worryingly some players choose online
gambling especially so they canplaywith theirwhole
family unlike in an on-site casino. One participant in
a qualitative study conducted by Cotte and La-
tour89 expressly stated “And here [at home90] if I win
something big, I can experience it with my [4 years
old91] daughter. “Mommy won!” “Mommy just won!”.
At a casino, she wouldn’t be able to sit there, have that
kind of enjoyment with me. … She gets to clap. … I don’t
think she understands what I am doing, but she gets
excited when she hears the noise on the computer. …
So she’ll start jumping up and down too.”92
Instances of parents/siblings/friends playing
with their children or allowing access to the gam-
bling account may not be fully recognised and ac-
counted for in prevalence studies and they may be
significantly higher than the current estimates indi-
cate. There is nothing in the Act itself that would
counterbalance positive and relaxed parental atti-
tudes. Unlike the regulation of alcohol,93 no proxy
offence exists whereby an adult commits a crime if
he purchases gambling product on behalf of a mi-
nor. In practice it is not possible for an adult to play
e.g. poker or slot machine on behalf of a child but
one can easily envisage an older friend allowing ac-
cess to his online gambling account or purchasing
scratch-card or a betting slip for or together with a
child. Such liability, although probably impossible
to enforce, is likely to be welcome by the industry
and could help with education and raising overall
awareness that gambling does carry some risks and
would further strengthen current provisions. Exist-
ing educational campaigns are very sparse and no
legislative or policymeasures require them to be fre-
quently used.
VI. Enforcement issues
With the introduction of the Gambling Act 2005 the
Gambling Commission became themain enforcer of
the statutory provisions. The Commission must op-
erate within the legal framework of its primary du-
ties, stated in ss. 22(a) and (b)94 and it must have re-
gards to theRegulators’ Compliance Code;Hampton
and Macrory95 reviews and the Enforcement Con-
cordat.96 Those principles advocate comprehensive
risk based assessments to ensure that resources are
allocated to areas mostly in need and to carry out in-
85 C. Jawad and S. Griffiths, “Taming off the casino dragon”, 1(3)
Community, Work and Family (2012), pp. 329 et sqq.
86 J. Derevensky et al, “Parental Attitudes towards gambling: results
from national Canadian study”, presented at the NCPG Confer-
ence in Singapore, August 2009.
87 J. Felsher, J. Derevensky and R. Gupta, “Parental influences and
social modelling of youth lottery participation”, 13 Journal of
Community & Applied Social Psychology (2003), pp. 361 et sqq.
88 J. Derevensky et al, “Adolescents Problem Gambling: Legislative
and Policy Decision”, 8(2) Gaming Law Review (2004).
89 June Cotte and Kathryn Latour, “Blackjack in the Kitchen: Under-
standing Online versus Casino Gambling”, 35 Journal of Con-
sumer Research (2009), pp. 742–758.
90 Note added.
91 Note added.
92 Cotte and Latour, 35 Journal of Consumer Research (2009), supra
note 89, at p. 754
93 S. 149(3) of the Licensing Act 2003.
94 Ss. 22(a) and (b) states “to pursue, and whenever appropriate to
have regards to the licencing objectives, and to permit gambling
in so far as the Commission thinks reasonably consistent with the
pursuit of the licensing objectives”.
95 Macrory Review’s recommendation underpinned the Regulatory
Enforcement and Sanction Act 2008
96 “Gambling Commission’s Statement of principles for licensing
and regulation”, September 2009 available on the Internet at
<www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk>, (last accessed in November
2013).
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spections only where there is an identifiable reason
to do so. This leads the Commission to adopt a facil-
itative and negotiating rather than a strict enforce-
ment approach. Such “light touch” is also explicitly
anticipated by the Act itself which can be seen by
contrasting ss. 27–28 of the Gambling Act with e.g.
ss. 22 or 24. Ss. 27–28 are permissive and power
granting in nature whereas s. 22 and s. 24 are duty
imposing. Thismeans that the Commission “may as-
sess compliance with the Act and licence condi-
tions97”; “may investigate whether an offence has
been committed98” and “may institute criminal pro-
ceedings in respect of any offence99” whereas is “shall
aim to permit gambling…100” and “shall issue one or
more Codes of practice101”. In light of the permissive
tone of the legislation it seems reasonable that pre-
vention of illegal gambling and money laundering
and the collection of licencing revenues may be giv-
en a higher priority than tackling underage access.
In any case the overriding duty to permit gambling
sits uneasily with the Commission’s role as the pro-
tector of the social good. Commercial demands nor-
mally advocate lenient attitudeswhich are largely in-
compatible with the protectionist requirements that
usually desire the exact opposite. Other external fac-
tors also constraint in practice the enforcement pow-
ers of the Commission. The enforcement role of the
police and local authorities has been reduced to su-
perficial levels102 and the Commission employs 200
officers with only around 60 members of staff per-
forming the function of field compliance officers
with investigative powers103. The significant limit
on available resources necessitates reliance on good
faith and voluntary compliance with the regulations
by the industry104 and on co-operation with the gen-
eral public105 rendering the soft approach may be
the only practical option, but not necessarily the
most effective one.
VII. Exposure
The Gambling Act has undisputedly encouraged a
significant expansion of perceived and actual gam-
bling opportunities. The proliferation of gambling
shops on a High Street resulted from the removal of
the demand test106 which prevents the Commission
and other bodies from restricting the number of li-
cences due to market saturation or a desire of a local
authority to limit the number of gambling venues
within their areas. Althoughminors are not even per-
mitted to enter land based betting shops and casinos
no similar restriction seems to apply to “virtual”
places and premises. The online gambling industry
does not generally restrict a mere access or entry to
the websites where betting or gaming takes place.
There is only a small number of providers107 that re-
quire registration before entering the actual site. On-
line casinos and betting shops offer exciting graph-
ics of a variety of gambling games such as roulette,
slots or card games often accompanied by stimulat-
ing audio effects as well as a wealth of information
relating to gambling: rules of games, tips, sugges-
tions, strategy advices and previous betting and gam-
ing results as applicable. Many also offer free demo
games which allow all players regardless of age to
practice and learn how to gamble for free before hav-
ing to risk any of their own money. For all intended
purposes they are the virtual equivalents of land
based betting and gaming venues but the Act does
not provide any provision that would outlaw such
virtual entry to minors.
Furthermore the Act permitted demand to be fur-
ther stimulated by commercial advertisements
which often glamorise gambling and focus on the
life changing benefit of a major win108. No regula-
97 S. 27 of the GA 2005.
98 S. 28(1)a of the GA 2005.
99 S. 28(1)b of the GA 2005.
100 S. 22(b) of the GA 2005.
101 S. 24 of the GA 2005.
102 Julia Black, “Tension in the Regulatory State”, 58 Public Law
(2007), at p. 2
103 Data collected from the Gambling Commission’s website. Avail-
able on the Internet at <www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk> and
<www.gamblingkingz.com> (last accessed in November 2013).
104 With nearly 3000 licences that have been issued to operators it
would be impossible for the 60 field officers to effectively enforce
compliance in the face of widespread and regular breaches of the
Code.
105 The Gambling Commission operates a “confidential intelligence
line” where general public may report any company offering or is
suspected of offering illegal gambling or which is otherwise in
breach of the Licensing Code.
106 S. 72 of GA reads as follows: “In determining whether to grant an
operating licence the Commission may not have regards to – (a)
the area in Great Britain within which it is proposed to provide
facilities, or (b) the expected demand for facilities which it is
proposed to provide”.
107 There are some operators e.g. Endemol Games Ltd who require
registration prior to entering the actual site or playing practice
games but the number of operators with such policy is very small.
108 John McMullan and Delthia Miller “Wins, Winning and Winners:
The Commercial Advertising of Lottery Gambling”, 25 Journal of
Gambling Studies (2009), pp. 273–295.
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tions whichmay be devised by the Secretary of State
have as yet been issued. In order to sustain demands
commercial marketing initiatives play an important
role within any industry but they may be particular-
ly influential to those who already experience some
difficulties with their gambling.109 Gambling adver-
tisements must not use youth themes or other fea-
tures that may be attractive to adolescents and their
broadcast should be restricted to after the watershed
of 9pm. This rule does not apply during transmis-
sion of live sport entertainment. This is justified by
the business needs of the industry but live sporting
events are very popular on terrestrial and subscrip-
tions based television channels and are often
watched together by the whole families. As identi-
fied by Bogart110 on pages 254 and 255 there is an
inherent conflict between “marketing practices of
gambling providers”which aim to increase consump-
tion and “responsible gambling” which more often
than not involves encouraging people to gamble less.
Furthermore, providers from the European Econom-
ic Area111 and other “white listed”112 jurisdictions
are also able to freely promote their services to
British customers without being subject to British
law. The Gambling (Licencing and Advertising)
Bill,113 if put into force, will impose British regula-
tion on all remote gambling companies that offer
their services to British customers regardless of their
physical location.114 This would constitute a barrier
to the EU free trade principle but as long as the bar-
rier is not discriminatory,115 is proportionate116 and
it meets “an appropriate overriding public policy ob-
jective117” it is unlikely to offend the EU Treaty. De-
spite increased knowledge and understanding
amongst adolescents of the marketing aims and me-
chanics children are still more vulnerable to the in-
fluence of advertisements than it is the case with
adults.118 Thewidespread promotion of gambling in
print, on television, radio and online further pro-
motes the appeal of gambling to all. The actual im-
pact of advertisement on participation rates is con-
tentious119 but even if they don’t increase the actu-
al uptake they certainly contribute to the normalisa-
tion of gambling as a familiar and socially acceptable
leisure activity.
VIII. Conclusion
This article demonstrates that the protective statuto-
ry provisions are narrow in scope and offer a weak
foundation for the protection of children from gam-
bling related harm. It is the goodwill of the gambling
companies and their desire to protect their reputa-
tional status within the society that prevents wide-
spread defiance of the law rather than the force of
the legislative framework itself. The legalisation of
commercial marketing of commercial products as
well as the widespread availability of gambling both
on the High Street and online actively promotes pos-
itive attitudes towards gambling and contributes to-
wards the perception of such activity being a harm-
free, fun entertainment. Tobacco advertising effec-
tively ceased on UK television in 1991 and supermar-
kets are now required to sell cigarettes from behind
closed shelves whereas gambling is actively promot-
ed on all forms of mass media. This expansion of ex-
posure is not effectively counterbalanced by the
statutory prohibition of minors’ gambling. The pro-
hibition is not absolute and the defence of due dili-
gence focuses the industry’s attention more on en-
suring that they have a valid and workable policy in
place and less on stopping youngsters from success-
fully purchasing gambling services . This is further
exacerbated by the lax enforcement which can be
demonstrated by the fact that 18% of children be-
tween the age of 11 and 15 years old admitted to gam-
109 G. Valentine and K. Hughes, “New Forms of Participation: Prob-
lem Internet Gambling and the Role of the Family”, Nov 2011,
available on the Internet at <www.lssi.leeds.ac.uk/project/5> (last
accessed in November 2013).
110 W.A. Bogart, Permit But Discourage: Regulating Excessive Con-
sumption, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011).
111 As required by Art. 46 and Art. 49 of the EC Treaty and equivalent
provision with regards to other EEA States.
112 White listed jurisdictions are: Alderney, Antigua and Barbuda,
Gibraltar, Isle of Wight and Tasmania.
113 Published on 3rd December 2012.
114 On the basis of regulation at the point of consumption and not at
the point of provision.
115 Art. 43 and 49 EC Treaty.
116 See, e.g. Case C-124/97, Läärä, ECR [1999] I-06067; or Case C-
67/98, Zenatti, ECR [1999] I-07289.
117 See, e.g. Case C-337/4, Van Binsbergen, ECR [1974] 01299.
118 “Letting Children be Children” Report of an Independent Review
of the Commercialisation and Sexualisation of Childhood by Reg
Bailey, available on the Internet at: <https://www.educa-
tion.gov.uk/publications/…/Bailey%20Review.pdf>, (last accessed
in November 2013).
119 Simon Planzer and Heather Wardle, “The Comparative Effective-
ness of Regulatory Approaches and the Impact of Advertising on
Propensity for Problem Gambling Report” (2011), prepared for
the Responsible Gambling Fund (currently Responsible Gambling
Trust), available on the Internet at <http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2045052> (last accessed in November 2013).
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bling in 2011; yet there has been no reported case of
any gambling company or person being prosecuted
under Part IV of the Gambling Act. To paraphrase
Bogart’s book title120 themain problemwith existing
framework is that British government permits gam-
bling but does not do enough to discourage “exces-
sive consumption”.
120 W.A. Bogart, Permit But Discourage: Regulating Excessive Con-
sumption, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011).
